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Abstract
A problem in a tolling system like AutoPASS is the number of unidentified
passages due to unreadable license plates. As a consequence money is lost
for the toll road companies. A scheme is proposed that uses anonymous
statistics to aid in the process of allocating resources for manual controls.
Due to legal requirements for anonymity of data produced at toll plazas,
a model that simulates the traffic frequencies on Norwegian roads is
developed and implemented in Java. Using the toll plazas that make up
Miljøpakken in Trondheim as a starting point, a simulation generating
three months worth of traffic amounting to almost 460 MiB of data
is performed. The simulated data were checked for its reliability and
similarity with real data. Calculations based on an optimistic estimate
on the number of AutoPASS subscriptions with rebated fares have shown
that nearly 370 000 NOK are lost due to unidentified vehicles over the
three months simulated. The outlined solution shows that toll plazas
with a higher number of unregistered passages can be identified and this
information can be used in subsequent planning activities for the purpose
of executing manual controls to reduce the losses.

Sammendrag
Et problem i et bompengesystem slik som AutoPASS er antallet av
uidentifiserbare passeringer som en følge av uleselige kjennemerker. Kon-
senvensen er at penger går tapt for bompengeselskapene. Et stystem
er foreslått der anonym statistikk blir brukt for å allokere resurser til
manuelle kontroller. På grunn av juridiske begrensninger på bruk av data
som blir generert i bomstasjoner har det blitt utviklet og implementert
en modell i Java som modellerer trafikk på veier i Norge. Ved å ta ut-
gangspunkt i bomstasjonene som er en del av Miljøpakken i Trondheim
blir det generert tre måneder med trafikkdata som utgjør nesten 460 MiB
med data. De simulerte data blir sjekket både på pålitelighet og likhet
mot ekte data. Kalkulasjoner basert på et optimistisk anslag av tallet
på AutoPASS-avtaler med rabatterte passeringer viser at nesten 370 000
kroner går tapt på grunn av uidentifiserte kjøretøy i de tre simulerte
månedene. Den skisserte løsningen viser at bomstasjonene med et høyere
antall uregistrerte passeringer kan identifiseres og at denne informasjonen
kan brukes i påfølgene planleggingsaktiviteter med formål om å utføre
manuelle kontroller for å redusere tapene.
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Chapter1Introduction
Riksrevisjonen published a report 11. December 2012 concerning their investigation
of the Norwegian toll sector [32]. The report concludes that the automation of
the sector has significantly contributed to making the toll payment process more
convenient for the users. The same report also stress that the levying of toll is not
carried out at the lowest possible cost. Riksrevisjonen points out that the operating
costs for 2011 was 12.5% of the total toll collected which amounts to 818 million
NOK. Other remarks include significant losses on receivables due to unpaid claims
and a costly image processing procedure due to vehicles passing without a tag.
AutoPASS is one example of a system that produces a lot of data that, if combined
and structured in the right way, can reveal a lot about an individual. The anonymity
provided by such dynamic systems presents a problem [30]. On one hand this
modernization is a good thing - it speeds up the whole payment process and simplifies
the process of paying for the usage of a transport service. On the other hand this
transaction produces an entry in a database. When your car equipped with an
AutoPASS tag passes a toll station, your subscription is identified by reading the tag
and you are billed accordingly. Even though a system such as AutoPASS lacks the
ability to identify the persons in the car, it is fair to assume that the car was driven
by the owner of the AutoPASS account or other individuals in that persons circle of
acquaintances with access to the car.
1.1 Previous work
A study on the privacy-related issues in dynamic systems such as AutoPASS was the
topic of [30]. This thesis concludes that there are challenges related to user privacy
and that work needs to be done on the legislative side to improve the privacy. Large
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scale data analysis can have a negative impact on user privacy as systems, such as
AutoPASS, gain more subscribers and the amount of stored data grows.
1.2 Tolling in other countries
On what grounds road toll is collected vary between countries. Some countries,
like Norway and Spain, may charge you relative to the road section. In Austria
you are required to buy a Vignette where you pay for a certain amount of time,
and not per road section. Evidence of payment is often realized as a visible toll
sticker that is attached to the vehicle. Some countries also levy a special city toll,
toll for using tunnels and toll on bridges. Many countries have adopted their toll
road systems to become more automated. Examples are the 407ETR in Canada
(http://www.407etr.com/), eFlow in Ireland (http://www.eflow.ie/), and TELEPASS
in Italy (http://www.telepass.it/) to name a few. All the former systems use a
transponder located in the car that communicate with the toll plaza when passing.
1.3 Aim of this thesis
As Riksrevisjonen points out, money is lost due to cars not being identified. The
Norwegian minister of transport and communications, Marit Arnstad, has indicated
as a response to Riksrevisjonen’s findings that a bill proposal to introduce mandatory
AutoPASS tags in vehicles above 3.5 tonnes is out on hearing [32, p. 18]. One could
imagine that mandatory tags for all vehicles on Norwegian roads is the next step.
This will produce vast amounts of data. Grouping this data together can reveal
information about a specific individual that might violate the right to privacy. One
goal of this thesis is to get a better understanding of how the AutoPASS system is
built up with respect to anonymity. A path that will be investigated is the possibility
to use anonymized traffic statistics to aid in the process of identifying cars. The
rationale is that if one, or a specific group of toll plazas, stand out with respect to
the number of unidentifiable transactions, one can target the efforts toward these
plazas. As an example of the above, look to the area of public transportation. Bus
companies perform manual controls to uncover people who do not pay - it is an
interesting question if this is something that could be employed in the toll road sector.
To investigate the problem further, a simulator is set up. To limit the area of focus,
the group of toll plazas that make up Miljøpakken in Trondheim are selected. The
simulator generates transactions at these toll plazas and stores them in a database.
A program is to be developed to process the data and reveal the statistics.
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1.4 Outline
The first chapter covers the background for toll levying in Norway and the AutoPASS
system. This is meant to provide an insight into the current protocols for registering
vehicles. Next, the reasoning and setup of the simulation and generation of statistics
are described. In the following chapter the results of the simulation are shown. The
applicability is discussed next, along with the anonymity issues in AutoPASS, before
the thesis is concluded.

Chapter2Background
2.1 AutoPASS in a nutshell
What AutoPASS provides is a service that allows the user to pay for the usage of
transport infrastructure. Examples include toll charges on bridges, tunnels, and
roads - one can even use the AutoPASS system on certain ferries in Scandinavia,
including the Flakk-Rørvik ferry connection in Sør-Trøndelag. What AutoPASS adds
is a service that allows seamless payment - the payment process is sped up by paying
for the service without even stopping the car and the payment system is accepted by
many transport services.
First the user is set up with a central account and given an AutoPASS tag. This
tag can be either a smart card or a Radio-frequency Identification (RFID) device
placed in the vehicle. In the smart card case, the user is required to present the
card to a machine or a cashier at the point of usage. The payment process can be
done without stopping if the RFID tag is used. The tag is attached to the inside of
windshield and when the car is passing the toll lane the tag is read and the user is
subsequently charged, either by deducting pre-paid money from the user’s account
or by sending an invoice.
2.2 Administrative outline of AutoPASS
2.2.1 Actors
Figure 2.1 shows the actors that make up the general model for the AutoPASS system.
You, as a user, want to use a transport service provided by an owner. To use that
particular transport service, for example a bridge, tunnel, or ferry, you have to pay
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User
OperatorIssuer Owner
Payment service
Payment service Transport infrastructure
Figure 2.1: Actors in the AutoPASS system
a fee. To collect these fees, the owner has put up charging points (or toll plazas)
that are administered by an operator. You, as the user, enter into a contract with
an issuer that provides you with a central account and a tag. When the operator
logs you at the charging point, a claim is forwarded to your issuer for the x amount
of money you need to pay for using the transport infrastructure. Your issuer then
fulfills the claim forwarded by the operator, meaning that it pays the x amount of
money on your behalf. This scheme works even if the operator and issuer are two
separate toll road companies as the AutoPASS system ensures interoperability by
enforcing standards.
The division outlined above can be made even more specific by an example. The
Norwegian Public Roads Administration (NPRA) owns the AutoPASS system as
a whole. They are responsible for the requirement specifications, choosing the
equipment and making deals with the vendors. The transport infrastructure, like a
bridge, tunnel, or road, is administered by the NPRA on behalf of the government.
Toll road companies have the right to levy toll for a specific project. Examples
of such companies are Eikesundsambandet AS, Nord-Jæren Bompengeselskap AS,
and Bergen Bompengeselskap AS. The toll company can operate and manage the
payment service themselves or they can outsource it. Companies such as Bro &
Tunnelselskapet, Fjellinjen, and Vegamot, represent operators that maintain the
payment service. Note that some of the latter companies are also a toll road company,
not just a payment-service provider.
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2.2.2 Legal background
The legal grounds for levying toll in Norway is found in Veglova §27, which states
that the Ministry of Transport and Communications (Samferdselsdepartementet),
on approval from the Parliament (Stortinget), can introduce toll on public roads in
Norway [23]. AutoPASS as a whole is owned and administrated by the Norwegian
Public Roads Administration (Statens Vegvesen). A number of contracts are signed
as part of the toll road process. An introduction to some of the contracts is given
below.
Bompengeavtalen
Bompengeavtalen is a legal contract between the toll road company and the govern-
ment represented by the NPRA. A standardized text forms the basis for this contract
and it is signed when the Parliament has approved the toll project. The signing
of the contract marks the point where the toll road company can start to levy toll.
The contract clarifies each party’s responsibilities in the toll road project. As an
example, the NPRA manages the construction and the toll road company finances a
percentage of the build to the extent indicated in the contract. Depending on when
the levying of toll starts, the toll company may need to take out loans to finance
the construction - this is how the toll company is able to finance the build when
the levying of toll starts after the project is finished and opened to traffic. The toll
company administrates the loan until it is repaid and enough money to terminate
the operation is collected. The maximum duration for a toll road project is set to 15
years, with a possibility of being granted five more years by applying to the NPRA
and Vegdirektoratet. A template of this contract can be found in [39, enclosure 1].
AutoPASS user contract
As a new user to AutoPASS you need to enter into a contract with an issuer to
provide you with a central account and an AutoPASS tag. The issuer is responsible
for initialization of the tag and is also responsible for this tag to other AutoPASS
operators. All AutoPASS users have access to the same general agreement, but there
are openings to enter into special agreements, for example where the operator is also
an issuer and is able to offer rebate on prepaid fares in its own toll plazas. If you as a
user enter into a contract with Trøndelag Bomveiselskap, you can get 30-50% rebate
on fares in toll plazas between Trondheim and Stjørdal. The amount of rebate is
dependent upon the number of prepaid fares. If you do not have this type of contract,
but still an AutoPASS tag, your issuer will be billed for the full price. Your issuer
8 2. BACKGROUND
will subsequently deduct this amount of money from your account or send you a bill
at a predetermined interval.
AutoPASS issuer contract
This contract is for companies that want to become AutoPASS issuers. Committing
to this contract gives you the ability to issue tags. The responsibilities of an issuer
have been mentioned earlier - these include managing the central account and pay
claims from other operators.
AutoPASS joint venture contract
This is a contract between the operators, owners of infrastructure, and the service
providers. As an example, a toll company that signs this contract is committed to
deliver a transport- and payment service compatible with the AutoPASS system.
2.3 Technical background
2.3.1 Standards and directives
The AutoPASS platform builds on a set of specifications set forth by the NPRA. On
the European level there is an interoperability initiative called Common Electronic Fee
Collection System for an ASECAP Road Tolling European Service (CESARE) set up
by Association Européenne des Concessionnaires d’Autoroutes et d’ouvrages à Péage
(European Association with tolled motorways, bridges and tunnels) (ASECAP) with
the goal of a common inter-operable Electronic Fee Collection (EFC) system in Europe.
Norway is represented in ASECAP by Norske Vegfinansieringsselskapers Forening
(Norvegfinans). AutoPASS and its specifications are based on recommendations by
ASECAP and system requirements from CESARE projects [18].
For an EFC protocol to receive widespread adoption and interoperability between
countries, some form of common understanding of how the system shall behave is
needed. NS-EN ISO 14906:2011 - Electronic fee collection - Application interface
definition for dedicated short-range communication is such a standard meant to
’provide the basis for agreements between operators, which are needed to achieve
interoperability’ [17]. Also worth mentioning is BS-EN 15509:2007 - Electronic fee
collection - Interoperability application profile for Dedicated Short-range Communica-
tion (DSRC). The European Union (EU) also pass directives which impacts Norway
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as a part of the European Economic Area (EEA). Directives of relevance include the
EFC directive [16] and the European Electronic Toll Service (EETS) decision [15].
2.3.2 AutoPASS system
This section is meant as a technical introduction to the AutoPASS system. The
entities that will be introduced in this section include the On-Board Unit (OBU),
the Road-side Equipment (RSE), and the Central System (CS).
OBU RSE CS
Interface OBU-RSE Interface RSE-CS
Figure 2.2: Nodes in the AutoPASS system
Figure 2.2 shows the nodes covered in this section, including the interfaces between
the nodes.
2.3.3 On-board unit
The OBU is located inside the vehicle, typically attached to the windshield [10]. It
partakes in the transaction that takes place when the vehicle passes the toll plaza.
The OBU, or sometimes also just tag, serves as a token representing the user and
the AutoPASS contract.
Figure 2.3: Norbit ITS FZ2358 OBU. The image is taken from datasheet [27].
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Figure 2.3 shows an example of an OBU.
2.3.4 Road side equipment
The Charging Point Equipment (CPE) is a collective term used about the systems
and modules placed roadside that make up the ’tool booth’. This includes the system
you see over the lane as you drive through but also the storage- and processing unit
stored close nearby.
Figure 2.4: Figure of RSE near Sluppen bru in Trondheim
In figure 2.4 you see an example of a roadside setup. The cameras are placed so
that they can capture both the front and rear license plates. Over the two lanes
one can see the DSRC units. Immediately after the lane one can see the light-signal
boxes. The house on the left is the facility where the roadside processing unit is
located. Transaction logs destined for the central system are stored here until they
are transferred.
2.3.5 Central System
The central system receives and stores information collected from the roadside
equipment. Transaction data generated by vehicles passing the toll plaza are sent
from the roadside system to the central system. CS Norge is the name for the central
system, and the system is developed by Q-Free [28].
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2.3.6 Interface on-board unit - charging point equipment
The OBU and the RSE are the two first entities that communicate in an AutoPASS
transaction. The part of the RSE that is being used for communication with the
OBU is termed Road-side Unit (RSU). Let’s cover some of the metrics on the radio
link first.
Radio Link
The radio link is set up as channels in the 5.8 GHz band. Four downlink carrier
frequencies (RSU to OBU) exist - 5.7975 GHz, 5.8025 GHz, 5.8075 GHz, and 5.8125
GHz [36], where the two latter frequencies are allocated on a national basis. The
uplink channels (OBU to RSU) are realized as a sub-carriers on either 2.0 MHz or 1.5
MHz, where a spacing of 1.5 MHz is recommended for interoperability with existing
installations [35]. The downlink and uplink bit rate are 500 kbit/s and 250 kbit/s
respectively. The limit for power varies depending on the subcarrier-shift. The limits
are -17 dBm∗ for 1.5 MHz and -24 dBm for 2.0 MHz. The lower limit is -43 dBm
and the OBU cuts off (no communication) if the signal strength drops below -60
dBm [35]. Doing the conversion from dBm to mW gives a power output of
−17 dBm = 20 µW (2.1)
−24 dBm = 4 µW (2.2)
To save power, the OBU is sleeping when not in use and is triggered to wake up
if it receives data. [35] gives 11 as the number of octets required for wakeup, but
stress that it can also be less. No special pattern is required. From the point the
OBU receives the trigger, the wake up time should be ≤ 5 ms [35]. There is also a
given tolerance for the drift in frequency. For the downlink the tolerance is set to ±
5 ppm (= 0.0005 %) and ± 0.1 % on the sub carriers [35]. The AutoPASS standard
explicitly states in requirement R-Link1-13 that an RSU shall handle a Doppler shift
of at least ± 1000 Hz [7].
To put this into perspective, imagine that the two radios are in-sync with respect to
frequency. A car driving through the toll plaza at speed will introduce a Doppler
shift, where the received frequency will shift up or down depending on the relative
speed and direction. Let’s assume channel 1 is being used (5.7975 GHz). This gives
a maximum speed in the order of 51.7 m/s (≈186 km/h). The calculations are given
in appendix A.
∗ dBm is used to show the measured power in reference to 1 mW on a decibel scale. 0 dBm is
therefore 1 mW. 3 dBm is 2 mW, and so on.
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Message exchange
The sequence of exchanged messages are sought illustrated in a sequence diagram in
figure 2.5.
RSE OBU
initialization.rq(BST)
initialization.rs(VST)
get_secure.rq(KeyGeneration, RND-1, TVP)
get_secure.rs(AutoPASSdata1)
set.rq(AutoPASSdata2)
set.rs
echo.rq()
echo.rs()
event_report.rq(release)
get_instance.rq()
get_instance.rs(AutoPASSdata3)
Optional
Figure 2.5: Sequence diagram showing the messages exchanged between the on-
board unit and the road-side unit. From [7].
The Beacon Service Table (BST) is periodically broadcast from the RSU. The BST
includes manufacturerID, individualID, time, and profile. The two IDs are set
by the manufacturer. The time-variable represents real time as a 32 bit UNIX
timestamp, and profile represents the subcarrier-profile supported by the RSU.
Upon receiving the BST, the OBU responds with the Vehicle Service Table (VST)
if any matching profiles are found. The VST includes confirmation of selected
profile, OBU link address, data on issuer of the tag labeled manufacturerId, a
sequence of flags called efcStatus where only OBUmoved and batteryLow are in use
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for AutoPASS. An EFC-ContextMark is included and contains information about
active subscriptions.
Upon receiving the VST, the RSU initiates a get_secure request. The request is
addressed to the link address of the OBU and contains an integer designating which
key generation method to use, keyGeneration, 4 octets of random numbers, RND-1,
and 4 octets with a time variable parameter to be used as freshness in Message
Authentication Code (MAC) generation, TVP. When the OBU receives the request, a
get_secure response is sent back to the RSU.
AutoPASSdata1 ::= SEQUENCE{
obuID CS1 [9],
efcStatus BIT STRING(SIZE (16)),
TC OCTET STRING(SIZE (2)),
RND -2 OCTET STRING(SIZE (4)),
MAC1 OCTET STRING(SIZE (4)),
MAC2 OCTET STRING(SIZE (4))
LogIndex INTEGER (0..255)
}
Listing 2.1: AutoPASSdata1
The enclosed information in the response is shown in figure 2.1 called AutoPASSdata1.
The obuID is a concatenation of three separate identifiers, according to a standardized
data format named CS1 [37]. The ID is 56 bits long (7 octets), where CountryCode
makes up the first 10 bits, IssuerIdentifier makes up the next 14 bits, and the last
32 bits are given by the ServiceNumber. efcStatus is mentioned earlier, holding
OBUmoved- and batteryLow flags. TC is the transaction counter stored locally on the
OBU which is 16 bits. RND-2 is a random number generated by the OBU. MAC-1 and
MAC-2 are results of a MAC operation using the KeyGenerationNumber- and time
variables received in the BST-message, RND-1 received in get_secure.rq, the obuID,
OBU status, and RND-2 generated in the OBU. LogIndex is a pointer to the last
entry on record in the OBU.
AutoPASSdata2 ::= SEQUENCE{
LogIndex INTEGER (0..255) ,
OBUstatusControl OCTET STRING(SIZE (2)),
passingLogData AutoPASSdata3
}
Listing 2.2: AutoPASSdata2
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AutoPASSdata3 ::= SEQUENCE{
LogType INTEGER (0..255) ,
SessionTime TimeReal ,
SessionServiceProvider Provider ,
StationLocation INTEGER (0..1048575) ,
SessionLocation BIT STRING(SIZE (8)),
TypeOfSession StationType ,
SessionResultOperational ResultOp ,
SessionResultFinancial ResultFin ,
ReceiptAuthenticator OCTET STRING(SIZE (2))
}
Listing 2.3: AutoPASSdata3
After receiving the get_secure response, the RSU wants to store a receipt of the
transaction on the OBU. The data are sought written to the LogIndex pointer
received from the OBU. The contents of the receipt are shown as AutoPASSdata2
and AutoPASSdata3 in listings 2.2 and 2.3 respectively. The OBU responds with
set.rs as a confirmation that the log file is stored.
The RSU can track the OBU while inside the boundaries of communication. This
is done by the echo request. The OBU answers with echo response. The RSE can
instruct the OBU to terminate the transaction by issuing a release request. The
receipts stored on the OBU can be retrieved by issuing a get_instance request.
posOfFirstInstance and posOfLastInstance indicates the number of records to
retrieve. Note that this query is not access restricted, meaning that anyone in
principle can implement the protocol and read the receipts from the tag [29].
2.3.7 Interface charging point equipment - central system
The interface between the CPE and the CS facilitates the transport of transaction
data from the CPE to CS and from CS to CPE.
Including the transaction related data; the RSE also sends picture files and exception
messages to the CS. A number of files also travel the other way. The OBU status file
is one example. It contains info on active OBUs such as the balance of the central
account and validity of the contract.
An introduction to the various files is given below.
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Transaction file
Each charging point generates a transaction file which, at regular intervals, is
transmitted to the central system. This transaction file holds records of variables
such as the obuID, primitives such as RND-1, RND-2, MACs, the price that was
charged, which light signals that were given to the driver, and OCR data. Every
passage will create an entry in the transaction file and make its way into the central
system when the transfer occurs, typically every 24 hours [8]. The transaction file is
large in the sense that it holds over 70 fields for every transaction. An overview of
the file is sought given in table 2.1.
Charging point related parameters (1-3)
Time related parameters (5-6)
Status parameters (8-10)
OBU identifier parameters (12-14)
Key- and security related parameters (16-27)
Sequence numbers (counters) (30-34)
Payment related parameters (28, 36-42, 49)
Lane- and signal related parameters (44-48)
Vehicle- and OBU related parameters including OCR (50 - 80)
Table 2.1: Overview of the transaction file sent from charging point equipment to
the central system.
Charging point related parameters include the ID of the toll plaza that was passed, if
the passing was in or out of a toll area, and the lane number. Time related parameters
include the time in YYYYMMDDHHMMSSmmm format, for example 20130101000101000.
A separate parameter indicates whether daylight saving time is used or not. The
status parameters include the signal code, which is a textual representation of how
the vehicle passed the toll plaza. An example is signal code #20 which states
”Passage in AutoPASS lane with expired validity or passage, no value left, or OBU
blacklisted” [8]. VehicleClass is a separate parameter indicating the type of vehicle.
TagStatusFlag is related to the OBU status file which is sent from the CS to the CPE.
The TagStatusFlag currently holds three flags, ’Wanted’, ’Video’, and ’Service’. If
the OBU status file contains any of these flags, a predefined action will be performed
and the corresponding flag will be set in the transaction file. If the ’Wanted’ flag is
set, it will trigger the camera to take a picture and send an exception to the central
system. The ’Video’ flag will also trigger the camera, and the ’Service’ flag seems to
be some sort of debugging mode that records additional information on the OBU
communication - the specification does not say in detail what is saved in the latter
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case [8]. OBU identifier parameters include the triplet used to uniquely identify an
OBU, CountyCode, IssuerIdentifier, and ServiceNumber.
Key- and security related parameters include the KeyGeneration (KGN) parameter
used to identify which generation of masterkey that is used, the random number
generated by the RSE during the transaction, RND-1. The Time parameter contains
the UNIX-time used to create the MACs. obuID is included and obuStatus contains
flags for ’obuMoved’ and ’batteryLow’. The transaction counter, TC, is an internal
counter in the OBU that increase with every passage. The TC is 16 bits, so it will
overflow when 216 − 1 = 65535 passes is reached. The counter should then be reset
to 0. RND-2 is a random number generated by the OBU. The obuID, obuStatus,
TC, and RND-2 is needed to verify the MACs generated during the transaction as
they, along with the secret keys, form the input to the MAC algorithm.
MAC1Status and MAC2Status indicate the result of the MAC verification roadside.
#0 indicate ’not checked’, #1 indicate ’checked, approved’ and #2 indicate ’checked,
not approved’. The MAC1 and MAC2 fields hold the specific message authentication
codes. Even though both MAC1 and MAC2 are sent in every transaction, it is
not always possible to check MAC1 roadside. To verify MAC1 one would need the
masterkey held by the issuer of that OBU, and this key should be kept private.
MAC2, on the other hand, is intended to be verified by knowledge of a foreign
masterkey. The key structure of AutoPASS will be covered in subsequent sections.
The requirement specification states that if any disputes occur, for example if MAC2
does not verify but MAC1 does, MAC1 is regarded as proof as it is verified by the
operator and responsible issuer of the OBU [9]. SignalLevel indicates the OBU
performance.
The next section holds a number of counters. SeqValidPayment indicates the number
of passages that was valid, SeqEnforced counts the number of situations where no
payment was made, for example if no OBU is registered, or no payment is made in
a manual lane. SeqCPETransaction counts every transaction sent from the CPE.
SeqVideoPicture counts the pictures sent from CPE to CS, for example pictures
taken if no OBU is registered, or if either the ’wanted’, ’video’, or ’service’ flags are
set in the TagStatusFlag, or post-payment by invoice. Test-images taken by the
cameras will not be included in this counter.
Payment related parameters hold parameters related to manual passages. TypeOf-
Payment specifies the payment medium for manual passages, for example #02 Credit
Card or #01 Cash. For other passages the default value is 00. TypeOfCreditCard,
CreditCardNumber, CreditCardExpiry, and CreditCardSequenceNo are related to
payments with credit card. Some of the fields are used for secondary purposes - if
credit card payment is not used, CreditCardNumber holds the KID-number in case
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of invoice payment. CreditCardExpiry hold the reason for ’Free passage’ in a manual
lane, for example ’0005 Funeral Procession’ or ’0002 Emergency’. MoneyBagNumber
holds the number of the bag used in the manual lane at the time.
The first parameter among Lane- and signal related parameters is a SignalCodeB-
itmap, indicating signals given during the transaction. Examples include ’OBU not
read’, ’OBU not detected’, ’OBU not authenticated’. LaneMode shows how this lane
was used at time of passage, for example if it was an AutoPass lane (#01), manual
lane (#02), free passage lane (#04). LightSignalCode holds the code for the light
signal presented after the transaction, with three possibilities, ’Green’, ’White’, and
’Amber’, indicating ’Approved passage’, Low balance passage’, or ’Invalid passage’
respectively.
The last block contains Vehicle- and OBU related parameters. First there is a record
of the validation file used for OBU verification. If the OBU is blacklisted the name
of the blacklist is given, otherwise the name of the OBU status file is used. Next
is a series of special parameters used for classification. Special parameters include
the measured length, measured weight, number of axles, special classification code,
number of passengers, measured width, and measured height. Optical Character
Recognition (OCR) parameters include data related to the vehicle’s license plate.
Pictures are taken of both front and rear license plates. The OCR process returns
the following, for both front and rear camera: License plate number, nationality of
license plate, OCR confidence, and OCR group. The confidence is produced by the
OCR process and graded from 0− 100, where the higher number indicates a higher
degree of confidence. OCR group is produced by the OCR function and indicates
the final result of the process, for example #0 Confident result, #1 Image with no
license plate number, or #3 need manual assistance. Results from both front- and
rear views are aggregated together and produce the following parameters: License
plate number (front and rear), nationality of license plate (front and rear), OCR
confidence (front and rear), and OCR group (front and rear). The difference from the
previous parameters is found in the OCR group, where a comparison is done between
the front- and rear readings. #0 Confident OCR result indicates that the readings
were found to match, #1 Image with no license plate indicate that no license plate
was found on either the front, rear, or both places. #2 need manual assistance on
the front, rear, or both places. #3 license plate mismatch between front and rear
reading. #4 possibly foreign license plate.
The last parameters in the transaction file are related to the European standard EN
15509 concerning interoperability. EN 15509 has a number of parameters stored on
the OBU. Examples are vehicle class, vehicle dimensions, vehicle axles, vehicle weight
limits, vehicle specific characteristics, equipment OBU id, and equipment status.
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The reconciliation record is the last record in the transaction file. It contains
the charging point ID, the time and the number of records on file, excluding the
reconciliation record itself.
OBU status file
The OBU status file holds parameters concerning a specific OBU and is sent from the
central system to the roadside system to take part in the transaction. The contents
of the file are shown in table 2.2.
Record type Indicating the purpose of the OBU record, for ex-
ample if it is to be deleted, updated, or is just a
new record
OBUCountryCode ISO country code. For Norway the code is ’NO’
OBUIssuerIdentifier Identifier of the OBU issuer
OBUServiceNumber Holds the OBU serial number
TypeOfContract Indicates what type of contact is used - pre-paid or
free passages contract
VehicleClass Description of type of vehicle
StatuslistFlag Flag indicating that a special function should be
executed on a passage of this OBU
Validity Indicating when the time-based contract expires
Balance Amount of money in the central account
Override Instruct the CPE to handle the transaction based
on #1 validity and balance parameters or #2 based
on the field in SignalCode
LightSignalCode Holds the parameter of what light signal should be
given
FareInformation For future use
LicencePlateNumber Holds the license plate number of the vehicle regis-
tered with the OBU
LicencePlateNationality Holds the nationality of the license plate number
Table 2.2: Overview of the OBU status file parameters.
2.3. TECHNICAL BACKGROUND 19
Price file
The price file holds information on the amount to be charged for a passage. Price
files can be differentiated; examples include type of vehicle, time of the day, day of
the year, and lane. There exist four types of price records that can be present in a
valid price file.
Type 1 A record of type 1 holds what you would expect from a price file, namely
price information. The format is shown in table 2.3.
Record type Indicates type of record - for type 1 records this is
set to 1
CP ID ID uniquely identifying the charging point
Lane ID Indicates the lane ID for which the record is valid
Lane type Indicates what type of lane the price is valid for.
One can differentiate between AutoPASS lanes and
manual lanes
Vehicle class Indicates what type of vehicles classes the file is
valid for
Week day Indicates which days the price is valid. ’0,1,6’
means that the price is valid for ’Sunday, Monday,
Saturday’
Month Indicates the month the price is valid
Day of month Used together with ’Month’ to cover pricing on
specific days
Time Specifies hours of the day when the price is valid.
’15’ means that the price is valid from 15:00
Min Used to specify the minutes in an hour in which
the price file is valid
Price Five characters are used to represent the price in
the range from 0 NOK to 99999 NOK
Table 2.3: Parameters in a type 1 price record
1 033 01 * * * * * * * 00005
Listing 2.4: Example of a type 1 price record
A valid price record of type 1 is shown in listing 2.4. The line tells us that this is a
type ’1’ record for charging point ’033’ and valid for lane ’01’. It is also valid for all
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lane types, all vehicle classes, on every day of the week, month, and day of month,
at every hour and minute of the day. The price is set to ’5’ NOK.
Type 2 A type 2 record shows the date from which the records of type 1 are valid.
Table 2.4 shows the parameters in the file.
Record type Indicates type of record - for type 2 records this is
set to 2
ValidFromDate A date specifying from when the price file is valid.
Format YYYYMMdd
Table 2.4: Parameters in a type 2 price record
2 20130101
Listing 2.5: Example of a type 2 price record
A valid type 2 record is shown in listing 2.5, indicating that it is a type ’2’ price
record and valid from January 1st 2013.
Type 3 A record of type 3 is the last record in the price file and it holds a parameter
indicating the number of records on file, excluding itself.
Record type Indicates type of record - for type 3 records this is
set to 3
Number of records on file The number of records on file
Table 2.5: Parameters in a type 3 price record
3 15
Listing 2.6: Example of a type 3 price record
A valid type 3 record is shown in listing 2.6, indicating that it is a type ’3’ record
and that the price file holds 15 records in total, excluding this record of type 3.
Type 4 A record of type 4 indicates when the price file was created, and is placed
first in the price file
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Record type Indicates type of record - for type 4 records this is
set to 4
Date when price file was
created
Date indicating when the price file was created.
YYYYMMddHHMMSS format
Table 2.6: Parameters in a type 4 price record
4 20130101000001
Listing 2.7: Example of a type 4 price record
Listing 2.7 is a valid record of type 4, indicating that the price file was created on
January 1st 2013 at time 00:00:01.
An example of an entire price file could look something like the example shown in
listing 2.8.
4 20130101000001
2 20130101
1 033 01 * * * * * * * 00005
3 3
Listing 2.8: Example of a price file
Picture file and picture text file
The picture- and picture text file are sent from the CPE to CS. The images are coded
in the Joint Photographic Experts Group (JPEG) format. The data included with
the picture is shown in table 2.7.
The picture text file records also contain the SignalCode, along with a text describing
the reason for taking the picture.
Currency file
An example of a valid currency file is given in listing 2.9. Table 2.8 shows the
parameters in a currency file.
A given conversion rate is valid from the time specified until it is replaced by a more
recent timestamp. In listing 2.9 we see that 1 EUR amounts to 7.49 NOK from 21st
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Time Time formated as YYYYMMDDHHMMSSmmm
DST Indicate if Daylight Saving Time is used
CP ID Charging point ID
Lane The lane number that was used
SeqVideoPicture Counter of the number of pictures taken that is to
be sent to the CS
OBU ID OBU ID
SignalCode Code indicating the reason for taking the picture
Table 2.7: Parameters in a picture file
CurrencyTypeNumber Standardized number for the currency. Ex-
amples are 578 for NOK, 840 for USD
CurrencyTypeAbbreviation Standardized abbreviation for the currency,
For example USD and NOK
Time The time from which the conversion rate is
valid, YYYYMMDDHHHMMSS
ConversionRate Conversion rate compared to NOK. Floating-
point number with two decimals
Table 2.8: Parameters in a currency file
978 EUR 20130421000000 7.49
978 EUR 20130512000000 7.61
208 DKK 20130512000000 1.02
Listing 2.9: Example of a currency file
of April 2013 at 00:00:00, until it is replaced by a new conversion rate of 7.61 NOK
for 1 EUR on the 12th of May 2013 at 00:00:00.
Operator file
The operator file is used to grant access to and identify operators of a charging point.
An example of a valid operator file is given in listing 2.10 and the parameters of the
file are given in table 2.9. The file contains three operators, but only two of the three
have access rights, as the Active-flag for Kari Kristiansen is set to 0.
2.3. TECHNICAL BACKGROUND 23
OperatorID ID identifying an operator
Password Password used for login with a given operator ID.
The password is restricted to be only four charac-
ters long
Active Variable determines if the operator ID can be used.
#0 Not active, operator ID cannot be used, #1
Active, operator ID can be used to log in
Operator name Variable length string indicating the name of the
operator
Table 2.9: Parameters in an operator file
0001 1234 1 Nils Nilsen
0023 2255 1 Per Persen
0142 0912 0 Kari Kristiansen
Listing 2.10: Example of an operator file
Blacklist file
Personal Account Num-
ber (PAN)
Unique number identifying the account
Rejection code Example: ’90 - OBU not valid, no reason given’,
’95 - OBU stolen’
Action code Example: ’01 - Reject the OBU’
Reserved Reserved
Table 2.10: Parameters in a blacklist file
7033191234567890127 95 01 00000000
7033191234567457521 99 01 00000000
9999999999999999999 00 00 00000002
Listing 2.11: Example of a blacklist file
Table 2.10 shows the parameters in an OBU blacklist file. Listing 2.11 shows an
example of such a file. Notice the last record in the file. The first 19 bytes are set to
9s to signify that this is a reconciliation record. The last 32− 19 = 12 bytes contain
the number of records on file, excluding the reconciliation record itself. The first
record blacklists PAN ’7033191234567890127’ with code ’95 - OBU stolen’ and action
’01 - Reject the OBU’. The second record blacklists PAN ’7033191234567457521’ with
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code ’99 - OBU returned from customer because of OBU fault’ with action ’01 -
Reject the OBU’
Exception messages
Exception messages are sent from the roadside equipment to the central system. The
messages are prioritized relative to the severity of the information in the message.
Messages labeled ’Fatal’ are coded as priority ’1’ and ’Information’ messages are given
the lowest priority code of ’5’. The time when the message originated is included,
along with the Daylight Saving Time (DST) field. ModuleNumber is the ID of the
module that generated the message. UnitNumber indicates the unit the message
holds information about. CategoryNumber is used together with ModuleNumber to
uniquely identify a message. AlarmText is a readable description of the exception.
Charging point ID ID identifying the charging point
Lane Number indicating the lane. If the fault is not con-
nected to a lane, 0 is used as value
Priority Exceptions can be given a priority flag from 1-5,
where the lower number indicates higher priority
Time Time when the message was constructed. YYYYM-
MDDHHMMSSmmm format
DST Indicate if daylight saving time is enabled
ModuleNumber Identifier for module where the message originated
UnitNumber Identifier for type of unit
CategoryNumber Code indicating the type of error
AlarmText Textual representation of the error
Table 2.11: Parameters in an exception file
Table 2.11 lists the parameters in an exception message. Listing 2.12 shows an
example. The message is from charging point ’34600’ and the priority of the message
is set to ’1’ (’FATAL’). The time of message generation was 15th January 2001
10:24:30.123 (DST). The ModuleNumber that generated the message was ’000001’
and the UnitNumber was ’01’ indicating the ’Charging Point Main Computer (PMC)’.
The textual description of the exception was ’Charging point main computer failure’.
34600 1 20010115102430123 DST 000001 01 001 ’Charging
point main computer failure ’
Listing 2.12: Example of an exception file
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2.3.8 Key hierarchy
As a car passes the toll plaza, the RSE has to know if this OBU is valid or not. If it
is valid, the obuID should be stored and the account should be charged. If it is not
valid, the cameras should be triggered to take pictures and handle the transaction
accordingly. For this check to be performed roadside, the issuer responsible for the
OBU has to provide the toll plaza operator with a key under which the MAC can be
verified. Two set of keys are made, both a native and a foreign key. The foreign keys
are distributed to other EFC operators so that they can validate OBUs from issuers
other than themselves. The hierarchy of keys is shown in table 2.12.
Key type Native Foreign Note
Masterkeys MKEY-N
(5)
MKEY-F
(5)
5 generations of
masterkey-pairs are de-
rived. The foreign keys
are distributed to other
operators.
OBU specific
keys
OBUKEY-N
(5)
OBUKEY-F
(5)
Keys to be placed on the
OBU are derived from
the masterkeys. A total
of 5 keys of each type are
created
Session specific
keys
SSKEY-N
(n)
SSKEY-F
(n)
Session keys are derived
from the OBU specific
keys.
Table 2.12: Key hierarchy in AutoPASS. From [9]
2.3.9 Key generation
The masterkeys denoted MKEY-N and MKEY-F are created by a third party
responsible for handling the keys. OBU keys are derived from the masterkeys and
stored on the OBUs by the manufacturer. A total of five pairs are stored, one pair
for each generation of masterkeys.
AutoPASS uses the Data Encryption Standard (DES) for calculating the message
authentication codes and generating the OBU keys. A brief introduction to DES
is given in appendix B. Triple-DES, or just 3DES, is used with two independent
keys. The ciphertext and plaintext are computed as shown in equations 2.3 and 2.4,
where P denotes the plaintext, C denotes ciphertext. E and D symbols encryption
and decryption respectively. K1 and K2 are two independent keys. To obtain the
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ciphertext, the plaintext is encrypted under K1. The result is then decrypted under
K2 and then encrypted under K1 again. To obtain the plaintext the ciphertext is
decrypted under K1, encrypted under K2, and decrypted under K1 again.
C = EK1 [DK2 [EK1(P )]] (2.3)
P = DK1 [EK2 [DK1(C)]] (2.4)
Masterkeys
The specification does not give a detailed outline on how the masterkeys should be
generated, just a set of requirements. A subset of these requirements are sought
summarized below [9].
1. Key generation mechanism shall be designed such that knowledge of one key
does not compromise others.
2. Keys should be generated independently.
3. Check for weak keys should be performed.
The specification states that a proven hardware-based random number generator
should be used to achieve these requirements [9]. Instead of relying on a software
process to produce the numbers, a hardware-based number generator relies on input
from a physical process. As an example, imagine that you will use the background
noise received from an antenna as the physical phenomenon. The antenna acts as a
transducer and transforms the radio waves into an electrical signal. The electrical
signal is amplified and is transferred into the digital domain with an analog-to-digital
(A/D) converter. If your process is behaving statistically random, and your conversion
does not alter this fact, you have a random number generator based on a physical
phenomenon. The emphasis on using a proven generator can be interpreted as
meaning that one should use generators with wide acceptance in the cryptographic
community.
OBU keys
A total of 10 keys are generated and loaded onto the OBU, 5 native- and 5 foreign keys.
The keys are generated by performing a triple-DES encryption on two permutations
of the obuID. The two sub-keys, KL and KR, are concatenated to produce a 16 byte
key. The algorithm for generating the OBU keys is shown in algorithm 2.1.
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Algorithm 2.1 Generation of OBU specific keys
Get the OBU ID (7 bytes)
Prepend OBU ID with ’FF’ to obtain 8 bytes.
-> VAL = ’FF’ || OBU ID Ex.: (’FF AA BB CC DD EE FF GG’)
Permute VAL to obtain PVAL Ex.: (’GG FF EE DD CC BB AA FF’)
A method to generate PVAL is shown below in JAVA syntax:
public static String rotate(String VAL) {
String PVAL = "";
for (int i = 0; i < VAL.length(); i++) {
PVAL += VAL.charAt(VAL.length()-1-i);
}
return PVAL;
}
Compute the first part of the key, KLEFT
KL = EDEMKEY−N (VAL)
Compute the second part of the key, KRIGHT
KR = EDEMKEY−N (PVAL)
Concatenate the two keys to make OBUKEY-N
OBUKEY-N = KL || KR
To produce OBUKEY-F (foregin key), the same procedure is run
with the foreign masterkey MKEY-F. The procedure is repeated
for each 5 generations of masterkeys, producing a total of
10 OBU keys.
The obuID is padded and encrypted using 3DES with two independent keys. A
masterkey is 16 bytes long, so two DES keys, K1 and K2, are generated by splitting
the masterkey into two 8 byte halves. After padding, the obuID is encrypted to form
the 8 byte subpart, KL, of the OBU specific key. The other 8 byte subpart, KR, is
made from doing the same encryption, but the padded obuID string is reversed. KL
and KR are concatenated to form a 16 byte OBU specific key.
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Session keys
Generation of session keys is described in alrogithm 2.2. One of the 5 OBU keys is
chosen. A time-variant parameter of 16 bytes is built up from the RND-1 and TIME
variables. The native- and foreign session keys are generated by an XOR of the TVP
with the OBUKEY-N and OBUKEY-F respectively.
Algorithm 2.2 Generation of session keys
Generate the native session key:
Use OBUKEY-N(KGN) corresponding to the KeyGenerationNumber,
KGN, agreed upon in BST/VST.
Set up the time-variant parameter - A total of 16 bytes:
-> TVP = RND-1 || TIME || RND-1 || TIME
Generate the 3DES session key from OBUKEY(n) and TVP
-> SSKEY-N = OBUKEY-N(KGN) ⊕ TVP = SSKEY-NL + SSKEY-NR
Next, generate the foregin session key:
-> SSKEY-F = OBUKEY-F(KGN) ⊕ TVP = SSKEY-FL + SSKEY-FR
The key has a total key-length of 16 bytes. The session key is often
referred to as SSKEY-(N/F)L and SSKEY-(N/F)R which is the
left and right subpart of the key, each 8 bytes long.
2.3.10 Message Authentication Code (MAC) generation
AutoPASS generates two message authentication codes, MAC-1 and MAC-2. MAC-1
is generated using the native session keys and MAC-2 is generated using foreign
session keys. The MAC process is built up as a block-chaining sequence, meaning
that a block cipher is run in multiple stages and output from previous stages is
used as input in the next stage. The variables used to make the MAC include the
obuID, obu status, transaction counter, and a random number generated by the
OBU, RND-2. The block chain works on 8 bytes at the time so the variables need
to be concatenated and padded out with 0s to become a multiple of 8 bytes. The
obuID is 7 bytes, obu status and the transaction counter account for 4 bytes, two
each, and the random number, RND-2, is 4 bytes. Summing up, that gives a total of
15 bytes and 1 byte of padding 0s are needed.
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The process of generating the MACs is shown in algorithm 2.3. The block chain
operation is illustrated in figure 2.6. The MAC message M is split into two halves,
where the first part becomes I1 = D1 and the second part becomes D2.
Algorithm 2.3 Generation of MAC-1 and MAC-2
M = OBUID || OBU STATUS || TC || RND-2
Pad out to the right with ’00’ so that M is a multiple of 8 byte
blocks
Ex.: M = ’AA BB CC DD EE FF GG’ ’HH II’ ’JJ KK’ ’LL MM NN OO’ ’00’
The generation of the MAC is split into stages.
STAGE 0:
I1 = D1
STAGE 1:
I2 = DESK1[D1] ⊕ D2
STAGE 2:
I3 = DESK1[I2]
FINAL STAGE:
Output = DESK1 [ DESK2[I3] ]
MAC = TRUNCATE [Output]∗
∗ The output after the last DES operation is truncated, using
only the 32 higher order (leftmost) bits, yielding a 4 byte MAC.
For MAC-1: K1:SSKEY-NL and K2:SSKEY-NR is used
For MAC-2: K1:SSKEY-FL and K2:SSKEY-FR is used
Increment transaction counter, TC.
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Input I1 = D1
DESK1
+
D2
I2
DESK1
Output
DESK2
DESK1
MAC
Truncate
Figure 2.6: Block diagram of MAC generation
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3.1 Outline
A major problem with AutoPASS is that if no OBU is present and the vehicle
license plates are unreadable, for example after a heavy snowfall or a long dry period,
identifying the vehicle is almost impossible. If the plates are unreadable by OCR
they are sent to manual inspection. In such situations, even manual inspection by a
human can prove difficult. Money is lost as the toll road company does not know
where to forward the bill and the manual labor significantly increases operating
costs. As a response to the findings presented in [32], the Norwegian minister of
Transport and Communications has indicated that there is an ongoing effort to
impose a mandatory AutoPASS OBU in every vehicle with a Gross Vehicle Weight
Rating (GVWR) over 3.5 metric tonnes, starting with vehicles used for commercial
purposes [32, p. 18]. The Norwegian data inspectorate implemented in February 2004
a licensing requirement for all automatic toll stations handling personal information.
At the same time, they demanded an anonymous payment scheme [14].
The vast amounts of data produced in the system gives room for another approach
to deal with the problem of people not paying. Anonymizing the traffic data and
analyzing it to predict or show where the problem is most severe and target these
toll plazas first. As an example, bus companies regularly have manual controls where
representatives from the company or hired security officers perform the controls.
Persons traveling with an invalid ticket are identified and issued a fine. An interesting
question is whether the same thing can be done in the automatic tolling sector. The
thought is to make an overview of these irregular passes and show them in a more
graphical way.
These following sections will outline how statistics are to be used and how to generate
sample data.
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3.2 Statistics
To limit the scope of this prototype the simulation includes the toll plazas that make
up what is known as Miljøpakken in Trondheim. Table 3.1 shows the location as well
as traffic per day for these toll plazas. The data are collected before and after the
toll plazas were put up, and changes in traffic volume is calculated in the rightmost
column. The source of the data is [25].
Toll point Before After Change
vehicles/24 hrs. vehicles/24 hrs. vehicles/24 hrs.
Klett E6 23 400 22 100 1 300 (-6 %)
Klett Rv 707 8 300 5 300 -3 000 (-36%)
Bjørndalen 13 000 8 400 -4 600 (-35%)
Sluppen bru 23 000 12 100 -10 900 (-47%)
Kroppan bru 50 000 50 500 + 500 (+1 %)
Nedre Leirfoss 5 000 2 000 -3 000 (-60%)
Være 13 000 8 900 - 4 100 (-32%)
SUM 135 700 109 300 -26 400 (-19%)
Table 3.1: Toll plazas in Miljøpakken. Data from [25].
The data in the After-column has been used to model the number of cars passing
the toll station during 24 hours.
The charging system is built up such that vehicles above 3.5 metric tonnes pay twice
as much as vehicles weighing in below that figure. Time-differentiated rates are also
used, meaning that between 07 - 09 in the morning and 15 - 17 in the afternoon, a
pass costs twice as much as it would normally cost. The exception is the toll plaza at
Kroppan Bru - passes at this toll plaza are not time differentiated. Table 3.2 shows
a comparison of the rates in the different toll plazas that make up Miljøpakken.
The time-differentiated cost means that the difference in traffic throughout the day
becomes an important factor. The data presented in table 3.1 are Miljøpakken in
Trondheim’s own calculations. They present the data as number of vehicles per 24
hours. The traffic is not uniform during these 24 hours - people travel to work in the
morning and home again in the evening. There are more cars on the road during the
daytime. The point is that the number of factors that influence the distribution of
cars are huge. Statens Vegvesen has developed a handbook for traffic calculations,
handbook 146 [38]. In one of the examples they present the traffic distribution over
24 hours for Elgesetergate in Trondheim. This figure is shown as figure 3.1. The
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Kroppan bru Kroppan Bru* Others Others*
Contract type Per pass Per pass Per pass Per pass
Base rate 5,- 10,- 10,- / 20,- 20,- / 40,-
prepay 2000,- 5,- 10,- 8,- / 16,- 16,- / 32,-
prepay 4000,- 5,- 10,- 8,- / 16,- 16,- / 32,-
prepay 7000,- 5,- 10,- 8,- / 16,- 16,- / 32,-
postpay private 5,- 10,- 8,- / 16,- 16,- / 32,-
postpay company 5,- 10,- 8,- / 16,- 16,- / 32,-
Table 3.2: Rates for the toll plazas in Miljøpakken. Values in NOK. From [11].
Columns with * are for vehicles weighing over 3.5 metric tonnes.
figure is quite old, September 1983, but capture some of the elements mentioned
above, namely how the traffic varies with people traveling to and from work. In
addition, figure 3.2 has been used to model the weekly fluctuations in traffic.
Example 3.2.1. In this example we will calculate the number of car passings at
Kroppan Bru between 10:00 and 11:00 at a Wednesday. Using figure 3.1, we estimate
that the hourly factor is 1.6. From table 3.1 we see that 50500 cars pass on a given
day. This gives us 5050024 · 1.6 ≈ 3366 cars between hour 10 and 11. Spacing these
out evenly over the hour gives ≈ 0.935 cars per second. Accounting for weekly
fluctuations figure 3.2 is used. The factor for Wednesday is ≈ 1.1. Multiplying in
this factor gives us ≈ 3703 cars between the hours of 10:00 and 11:00. The number
of cars is randomly distributed over the time interval [start, stop), where start in our
case is 10:00 and stop is 11:00.
Another problem is how to model the percentage of cars that have an AutoPASS
tag, and if they have one, how to set the probability of it working at the time of
the transaction. The chairman of Trondheim Bomveiselskap was interviewed by
adressa.no on the 6th of June 2013 about the fact that Miljøpakken is reaching 1
billion (109) in collected funds. In the interview he gives a comment about tag-
percentage in Trondheim, stating that 15 percent does not have an AutoPASS tag
[2]. How this number is calculated was not explained. We can only assume that this
is a good estimate for the number of vehicles with an AutoPASS tag. In the event
that no AutoPASS tag is registered in the passage, and the subsequent license plate
identification reveals that the vehicle is in fact registered with a valid AutoPASS
subscription, the user’s account is billed as if the AutoPASS tag was working.
The 15 percent failed AutoPASS transactions will trigger the cameras to take a
picture and the OCR system will provide the license plate number. The Automatic
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Figure 3.1: Graph showing model used to simulate traffic over a 24 hour period.
Data from [38]. (reproduced)
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Figure 3.2: Scaled weekly traffic patterns. Data from [40]. (reproduced)
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License Plate Reader (ALPR) hit rate will vary. Weather conditions can greatly
influence the readability of the license plates. A good estimation for the hit rate of
such OCR systems seems to be around 95-98 % [3]. If the OCR fails, meaning that
the front and rear results do not match or the result is just negative, the pictures are
sent off to manual inspection. No viable statistics have been found for the manual
inspection hit rate. It is therefore assumed that an operator, in the case where the
OCR has not returned a confident result, is able to identify 50 percent of the vehicles.
Let us look at this from a reliability point of view, but first let us state the assumptions
behind this model. The following analysis assumes that the AutoPASS tag, OCR
system, and manual inspection fail independently. This is a simplification that might
not hold in the real world, for example if the OCR fails, the manual inspection
is more likely to fail. We identify that if the AutoPASS tag, the OCR system, or
the manual inspection works we are able to identify the vehicle. The AutoPASS
tag works with probability Ptag = 0.85. The OCR function works with probability
Pocr = 0.95. The manual inspection works with probability Pmanual = 0.5.
POCR
Ptag
Pmanual
Figure 3.3: Reliability of AutoPASS charging
This forms a parallel structure where each block represents the probability Pi that
subsystem i is working. At least one of the subsystems must be working for the
vehicle to be charged. We have that
Pworking = 1−
n∏
i=1
(1− Pi) (3.1)
Pfailed =
n∏
i=1
(1− Pi) (3.2)
In the simulation, the probability of not being charged for the passage is therefore
the probability that none of the subsystems are working
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Pno charge =
3∏
i=1
(1− Pi) = (1− 0.85) · (1− 0.95) · (1− 0.5) = 0.00375 (3.3)
3.2.1 Scope of model
The model above is limited in scope - it does not capture every nuance one would
see if real traffic data was used. When talking about traffic and traffic patterns it is
customary to talk about hourly-, daily-, and annual variations. The model captures
fluctuations in the traffic throughout the day as well as variations throughout the
week. However, it is not concerned with variations throughout the year and increased
traffic on days of the year when we normally see increased traffic, for example around
the Easter holidays. As a direct result of that, the model fails to capture the reduced
’work traffic’ in the summer months and around the Christmas holidays.
3.3 Setup
This section is dedicated to the hardware- and software foundation for the simulation.
3.3.1 Computer hardware
The hardware available has been one HP Compaq 8100 Elite SFF running Windows
7 and one HP Compaq dc7700p SFF running Xubuntu. Some of the hardware found
in the two computers are listed in figure 3.3.
Component HP Compaq 8100 Elite HP Compaq dc7700p
SFF
CPU Intel i7 860 (2.80 GHz) Intel Core 2 6400 (2.13
GHz)
Hard drive 500 GB, 7200 RPM
SATA 3.0 Gb/s
160 GB, 7200 RPM,
SATA 3.0 Gb/s
Operating System Windows 7 Xubuntu 12.04.02 LTS
Table 3.3: Computer setup
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3.3.2 Installation
The code for generating toll plaza events are written in java. It generates toll events
and push these to a mySQL database. The mySQL database was set up on the Linux
box described above. phpMyAdmin, an administration tool for mySQL was set up along
with Apache.
The setup was performed as indicated below.
apt -get install apache2
PHP5 was installed and Apache restarted.
sudo apt -get install php5 libapache2 -mod -php5
sudo service apache2 restart
The installation of Apache and PHP5 was verified by creating a test page, test.php,
under /var/www, with the following code.
<?php phpinfo (); ?>
The setup was verified by running test.php in a web browser.
http :// localhost/test.php
mySQL was set up issuing the following command.
sudo apt -get install mysql -server
Opening /etc/mysql/my.cnd The bind-address was changed from 127.0.0.1 to
0.0.0.0, making it listen on all interfaces.
Next the root user was set up with a password.
mysql -u root
mysql > SET PASSWORD FOR ’root ’@’localhost ’ = PASSWORD(’
password ’);
After the root user was set up, a database was set up for this project along with a
user.
mysql > CREATE DATABASE masterdb;
mysql > GRANT ALL PRIVILEGES ON masterdb .* TO ’master_user
’@’%’ IDENTIFIED BY ’password ’;
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phpMyAdmin was set up with Apache.
sudo apt -get install libapache2 -mod -auth -mysql php5 -mysql
phpmyadmin
sudo service apache2 restart
3.3.3 mySQL setup
A database was set up on the mySQL server. The table was named AutoPASS. Listing
3.1 shows the SQL syntax. An index was created on the timestamps as an effort to
speed up queries where a specific time interval was queried. This makes WHERE
clauses on timestamps faster as mySQL does not have to sequentially search through
the whole dataset. There is no ’free lunch’ and maintaining the B-tree of indexes
make inserts more costly.
CREATE TABLE AutoPASS (
id INT AUTO_INCREMENT NOT NULL ,
name ENUM(’Bjørndalen ’,’Klett 707’,’Klett E6 ’,’
Kroppan Bru ’,’Leirfossen ’,’Sluppen Bru ’,’Være
’) NOT NULL ,
timestamp BIGINT (14) UNSIGNED NOT NULL ,
heavyVehicle BOOLEAN NOT NULL ,
price FLOAT (6,2),
hasTag BOOLEAN NOT NULL ,
OCRsuccess BOOLEAN NOT NULL ,
PRIMARY KEY (id)
);
CREATE INDEX time
ON AutoPASS (timestamp);
Listing 3.1: SQL syntax for the AutoPASS table
3.3.4 Java
Figure 3.4 shows a rough design of the system to be implemented. The Generator
class contains functionality to create toll passages based on the methodology outlined
in previous sections. The transactions are pushed to an SQLWorker that will push
the data into a mySQL database. Graphs are generated in the Graphing class by
reading the data back from the database. General statistics, for example number of
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transactions and total amount of money collected, are generated in the Statistics
class. The GUI class displays the graphs and statistics.
Figure 3.4: Class diagram
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The following external libraries were used in the process. JFreeChart is a graphing
library for the Java platform. JCommon is a dependency used by JFreeChart that
provide layout, configuration and interface classes. For more information on the
JFree project, the reader is directed to http://jfree.org/. The mysql-conenctor is a
driver that allows you to connect to a mySQL resource in java. For more information
the reader is directed to http://dev.mysql.com/downloads/connector/j/.
jfreechart-1.0.14 Graphics tool
jcommon-1.0.17.jar Dependency for jfreechart
mysql-connector-java-5.1.24-bin Handles connection to mySQL database
Table 3.4: Java included libraries
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4.1 Simulation
As a test case the Java simulator has been used to generate three months of test
data. Data from 1st January 2013 until 31st March 2013. That amounts to over
11 million transactions stored in the database. It turned out rather quickly that
the limited hardware on the Linux box was not optimal for such a large amount of
inserts. The hard drive got saturated with writes right off the start. Some efforts
were made to optimize the mySQL settings - increasing buffer pool sizes and flush
methods. Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU) also provide a
mySQL database for students∗. This setup outperformed the local database running
with optimizations, comparing inserts per second.
For this test the NTNU database was used without any changes to the default
settings. Generating and writing the whole dataset was timed, and the process took
182 minutes. Looking into the space usage provided the following statistics. The
data in the database amount to 455.9 MiB. The indexes on the primary key and
timestamp account for 329.0 MiB, making the total storage space 784.9 MiB. This is
summarized in table 4.1.
∗ mysql.stud.ntnu.no
Generation time 182 minutes
Storage space 784.9 MiB
Entries 11 200 000
Table 4.1: Database parameters
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4.2 Program for displaying the statistics
This section concerns the program developed to display the statistics made in the
simulation. The program has two tabbed panes where one can select either graphs or
statistics. Figure 4.1 and 4.2 shows two excerpts of the graphics pane. Four types of
graphs can be generated, weekly transactions, daily transactions, daily unregistered
transactions, and unregistered transactions per toll plaza. For every graph one can
select which toll plazas to include transactions from by checking the radio buttons.
Two buttons are provided to set all and clear the selected toll plazas respectively.
The wanted time interval is entered into the start- and stop time boxes. The time
must be formatted as yyyyMMddHHmmss, where y is the year, M is the month, d is
the day, H is the hour, m is the minute, and s is seconds. 20130101000021 means
Tuesday 1st 2013 00:00:21. The time interval is used to format an SQL query to fetch
the transactions within the given time interval. Pressing the make button generates
the graph indicated in the check box group.
Figure 4.1: Screenshot of graphics pane showing toll plazas and graphing options
Figure 4.2: Screenshot of graphics pane showing time fields and make button
4.2.1 Database statistics
Figure 4.3 shows a view of the data stored in the database. The shown parameters
include the number of stored transactions, the number of transactions where the
vehicle could not be identified, the percentage of vehicles above 3.5 tonnes, the date
for the first and last entry in the database, and the total amount of money charged.
In this run there were 11 200 000 transactions in the database. 42051 of these were
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transactions where no money could be charged, meaning that the vehicle had no
OBU or the transaction failed, the OCR function could not find the license plate,
and the manual inspection was not successful. The percentage of heavy vehicles is
18.62 percent. The date for the first and last record on file is Tuesday 1st January
00:00:01 CET 2013 and Saturday 30th March 20:00:00 CET 2013 respectively. The
total amount of money collected is 98 132 202 NOK.
We see that the number of no-charge transactions match the probability of not being
charged calculated in equation 3.3
Pno charge =
3∏
i=1
(1− Pi) = (1− 0.85) · (1− 0.95) · (1− 0.5) = 0.00375 (3.3)
Pobserved =
42051
11200000 ≈ 0.003754 (4.1)
4.2.2 Transactions per day-of-week
Figure 4.4 shows transactions per day of the week for all the toll plazas combined.
We see the week spanning from 1st to 7th of January 2013. Wednesday, Thursday,
and Friday were the days in the week with the highest number of transactions - all
peaking with over 140 000 transactions per day. The transaction count on Saturday
and Sunday are approximately 97000 and 87000 respectively.
4.2.3 Transactions per hour-of-day
Figure 4.5 shows transactions per hour of the day for all the toll plazas combined.
The underlying distribution is as shown in figure 3.1 on page 34. Looking at the
traffic pattern, it increases as people travel to work, decreases after that and increase
as people are going back home. The graph shows that on the given day, 1st of January
2013, the traffic in all toll plazas combined was at its highest between the hours of
15 and 16, peaking at just above 11000 cars in that hour (≈ 183 cars every minute).
4.2.4 Unregistered transactions per day
Figure 4.6 shows transactions where no vehicle was charged and displays it per day of
the month. In this example all toll plazas were selected, so the resulting graph is an
aggregate of unregistered passes recorded at every toll plaza. Looking at the figure
we see that the 23rd of the month stands out with a sum of over 580 unregistered
passes.
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4.2.5 Unregistered transactions per toll plaza
Figure 4.7 shows unregistered transactions per toll plaza in a cake diagram. The
figure shows that the highest number of unregistered transactions are recorded at
Kroppan Bru, with 23 711 unregistered vehicles from 2013-01-01 to 2013-03-31.
4.3 Evaluation of data
All the data used to make the graphics are simulated and not real. One observation
with the use of such data is that when looking at the big picture, for example the
total number of cars, total number of unregistered cars, total percentage of heavy
vehicles, total amount of collected money, the figures might seem reasonable. What
such a model often fail to capture however, is the smaller nuances and the seemingly
smaller ’events of randomness’ one might find in the real world. Examples could be
traffic accidents, weather conditions, or even equipment malfunction to some extent.
Traffic accidents may impact the graphs in many ways; the peaks in traffic might be
shifted, or flattened. A traffic accident near one toll plaza might cause the traffic to
be redirected onto another road and subsequently another toll plaza.
Figures 4.4 and 4.6 show the number of passages per day of week and the unregistered
passages per day of the month respectively. The two graphs are correlated in the
respect that we see more unregistered passes on the days where the traffic is higher.
This result is expected based on the simulated probabilities and the expected values.
The graphs show that the collections of toll plazas at Kroppan Bru see the most
traffic, as shown in figure 4.7, with over 50 percent of the overall traffic recorded in
the simulation.
Figure 4.3 show that there are 42 051 vehicles that could not be identified over a
timespan from 2013-01-01 to 2013-03-31. Compared to the total transactions on
record this amounts to ≈ 0.375% of the total number of transactions. This does
not seem like a big number, but let’s put it into perspective. The total amount of
charged money amounts to 98 132 202 NOK. Divided out over every transaction that
was charged this gives a sum of 8.79 NOK per passage on average.
98132202
11200000− 42051 ≈ 8.79 NOK/passage (4.2)
Taking into consideration the 42 051 vehicles that were not charged and multiplying
in the average rate gives a total lost revenue of 369 831 NOK. This is an optimistic
estimate based on the number of users with special contracts and rebated fares. It is
assuming that all transactions, where an AutoPASS tag is registered, are entitled
to a rebate (excluding the toll plaza at Kroppan Bru where no rebate is given). In
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reality the average rate will probably be higher. As an example, an increase of the
average price per pass by 10 percent increases the lost revenue to ≈ 407 000 NOK.
4.3.1 Example of a specific case
Figure 4.8 shows a set of images captured from the simulation program. The figure
shows a peak in unregistered passages at Kroppan Bru for that day with just over
332 entries.
Looking at the graph showing the breakdown in unregistered passes for the whole
month, this toll plaza show more or less consistent pattern for high number of
unregistered transactions for the last three days of the weak, Friday, Thursday, and
Wednesday (Dates 8, 7, 6, 15, 14, 13, etc.). If such consistent patterns are observed
in a real life scenario it is a strong indicator to the fact that this toll plaza should be
prioritized. If, however, only single peaks show up, the decision on when to put up
controls are not that simple to make. It is interesting to check if such single peaks
can be correlated with local conditions. Say for example that in a period with a
heavy snowfall there is especially one toll plaza that shows an increased number of
unregistered passages, or on cold, dry days where the usage of studded winter tires
contribute to an increased amount of dust particles in the air. This knowledge can
also be valuable in a situation where one needs to prioritize between plazas.
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Figure 4.8: Collection of figures showing a peak in unregistered passes at Krop-
pan Bru on 8th February 2013

Chapter5Discussion
5.1 Simulation
What we set out to test was if it is possible to use anonymous traffic statistics to
assist in the process of identifying cars that are not charged. The analysis of traffic
data can reveal patterns that can direct the toll companies and their efforts for
overcoming the problem. Storing vast amounts of data that are directly linkable
back to concrete individuals, for a longer period of time than necessary for providing
the toll road service, is not desirable. The following section gives an overview of the
data the system is built upon.
5.1.1 Anonymization
For a dataset to be characterized as anonymous there should be no way of linking
the information to an individual person. As an example, the license plate number
and OBU id are pieces of information that can be directly tied to an individual. The
license plate number can be cross-referenced with the vehicle register to reveal the
owner; the OBU id can be checked against a list of active AutoPASS subscriptions
and reveal the owner of the account. Both are examples of parameters that should
be avoided.
The data that are stored for a given transaction in the simulator is listed in table
5.1.
None of the parameters can be used to directly tie an individual to a passage.
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name Name of the toll plaza
timestamp Time of the transaction
heavyWehicle Indicates if the vehicle is over 3.5
tonnes
price The price charged for the transaction
hasTag Indicates if the AutoPASS transaction
was successful
OCRsuccess Indicates if the OCR function was
successful, either automatically or by
manual inspection
Table 5.1: Parameters that are stored in the database
5.1.2 Executing a control
If a toll station is selected for control a new set of problems arise. Inspectors need
to be warned when a vehicle passes the toll plaza unidentified. Unidentified in this
sense means a car that does not have a working AutoPASS tag and the OCR check
is negative. In the real system, if no tag is present and the OCR fails, the manual
inspection of the photographs is the last instance for identifying the vehicle. At this
point one does not know if the photographs will reveal the license plate number by
manual inspection. To make the control as efficient as possible, only vehicles that fall
into the category which are not identifiable by manual inspection should be stopped.
This means that operators have to inspect the photographs and make their decision
in real time. A setup that displays the front- and rear view of the license plates of
these flagged vehicles will simplify the work process. The operator then assess if
identification is possible or not. In the latter case the car should be stopped. In the
former case the car should be allowed to pass and the exception handling of that
passage should be carried out as in the normal case.
Figure 5.1 shows one of the toll plazas located near Kroppan Bru in Trondheim.
The setup of an efficient control point could prove difficult. You want to disrupt the
normal traffic as little as possible and at the same time have a safe area to stop cars
for control in the near vicinity of the toll plaza. Monitor stations would typically be
located near to the road side equipment, both for ease of access to the data from
AutoPASS, but also easier visual identification of the vehicle to be stopped - an
accurate description of the vehicle in question can then be radioed to the officers at
the control point.
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Figure 5.1: Toll Plaza near Kroppan Bru. Not necessarily room for stopping
cars. Image attribution: Google Maps [19]
5.1.3 Legal issues
Is makes sense to mention some legal issues related to stopping cars in the way
described in previous sections. Considering who should carry out the controls is
an important question. Looking to other areas of public transportation and using
buses as an example, passengers using the service have to accept the transport
regulations set forth by the company. As a concrete example, if one travels by one
of AtB’s buses in Trondheim, the company’s transport regulations give the driver
and separate inspectors the right to control your travel documents [4, §7]. Travelers
who at the time of control cannot provide proof of valid travel documents are issued
a fine. Adopting this scheme to the toll road sector is an interesting thought, but
is not necessarily a straightforward adoption. The cars that should be stopped all
have discrepancies related to the license plate, but they may need to be handled
differently with respect to the law. Not drawing any conclusions to how the laws
are to be interpreted, there is a difference in stopping a muddy car with unreadable
license plates and stopping a car with no license plates at all. Not to mention if
the control reveal deliberate efforts where the license plates are obscured to avoid
paying toll. The latter is probably a good reason to press charges. Nonetheless, a
review of the technical state, especially related to the visibility of license plates, is
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best left to representatives of the NPRA or the police, likewise is issuing tickets
for law violations also a police matter. As a minimum, the stopped car should be
charged for the passage. In regard to the other violations mentioned above it should
be up to law enforcement officers to assess further action. An important factor is
the general deterrence aspect - if the public see that focus is given to this area and
that deliberate efforts to avoid paying toll is not accepted, it can deter others from
attempting the same. The increased possibility of being caught might contribute
positively in this sense.
5.1.4 Related systems
A system that is operating in a similar area as the one outlined in this report, is the
system used for automatic number plate recognition by the NPRA. The system is used
to sort out cars that have prohibitions, no insurance, are stolen, or any other reason,
based on the NPRA’s registers, for not being on the road. The system takes a photo
of the license plate of the vehicle, use OCR technology to recover the license plate
number, and cross-reference the number against a list of vehicles with prohibitions.
This gives more efficient controls, as only vehicles with registered prohibitions are
stopped. The Norwegian Data Protection Authority (NDPA) has issued a report
regarding an inspection they conducted of the system and the NPRA 17.08.2012 [6].
This report is relevant with respect to the control situation outlined for unregistered
passages in the AutoPASS system, but also in the context of gathering statistics.
Regarding the latter, the NDPA observes that statistics are generated for the purpose
of allocating resources at times when they can be best utilized [6, p. 3]. This is an
argument which is in agreement with the proposed scheme for AutoPASS outlined
above. The license plate numbers that trigger an alarm are stored for one hour
before they are deleted. This is the case for both the roadside control situation as
well as the in the case of statistics generation. License plate numbers that do not
trigger an alarm are immediately deleted in the roadside control situation. In case of
generating the statistics for these passes, the event is registered and then deleted.
An important aspect is that the NDPA finds that the generation of statistics involves
personal information and thus should be handled in accordance with the Personal
Data Act. With the Personal Data Act as a foundation, the question becomes a
trade-off between the NPRA’s interest in the information and an individual’s right to
privacy - this is also an issue covered in the law, where the right to handle personal
information can exceed the right to individual privacy if the reasons for storing
the information are found to be of greater importance than the right to privacy
[24, §8f]. What justifies as important reasons in this matter is not easily answered.
To avoid this issue in an AutoPASS setting, the stored data, for the purpose of
generating statistics, need to be anonymized in a timely and sufficient way so that
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the information can be handled on a general basis that is not governed under the
Personal Data Act. Looking closer at the control situation, the vehicles that are
stopped have triggered an alarm based on the license plate number. In the event of
an alarm, a number of parameters are collected from other systems. Some examples
include: the reason for the flagging of the license plate, color of the license plate, color
of the vehicle, the date the vehicle was flagged, the date the vehicle was registered
in Norway, vehicle group, and brand. In addition, the persons in the vehicle can be
identified as a result of the control.
The NDPA concludes that, pursuant to the law, the NPRA can handle personal
information for the purpose of inspecting vehicles [6, 7.2.3]. At the same time, the
NPRA is ordered to stop handling personal information for the purpose of generating
statistics, or limit the handling to a minimum required for generating statistics and
subsequent deletion of the data as soon as the statistics are generated [5].
The lessons that can be learned from this project, and related to the AutoPASS
sector, are that the purpose for generating statistics need to be well founded and
organized, even more so if handling personal data is involved. The NDPA enforce
strict guidelines when it comes to how long time one can store personal data - given
the previous example, the sooner the data is deleted the better. The foundation
for using electronic aids in relation to traffic controls looks to have been given the
green light. The argument of aiding in the purpose of controlling vehicles is also
transferable to the AutoPASS scheme, as the main purpose of the control is to identify
the discrepancies regarding unreadable license plates.
5.2 Anonymity
5.2.1 Anonymity in AutoPASS
The first part of this section will cover the pieces of information that are stored in
the AutoPASS system. As previously mentioned you need to enter into a contract
with an issuer who will then provide you with an AutoPASS tag. As an example,
if you want to enter into a contract with Fjellinjen you are required to provide the
following information: First- and last name, address and postcode, country, e-mail
telephone, date of birth, bank account number, vehicle license plate number, vehicle
brand, contract start date, vehicle class, and vehicle nationality. A photocopy of this
contract can be found in appendix C. This information is stored along with your
AutoPASS tag number and central account details.
The NDPA has regulated the electronic toll sector. If a company wants to operate a
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fully automatic toll plaza and store personal information they need to apply for that
privilege. The NDPA sets a number of requirements for granting the application.
One requirement is to implement an ’alternative payment solution’. The complete set
of requirements can be found in [13]. Personvernnemnda is a body of appeal under
the NDPA. The NDPA decided to regulate the electronic toll sector in February
2005 - the decision was appealed by the NPRA [31]. One point of dispute was that
manual toll plazas allowed the users to travel the roads more or less anonymously -
an introduction of the AutoPASS system would not provide the same level of privacy
for the users. The NDPA pushed for a system that ensured the user’s right to privacy.
Discussions went back and forth [31], and Personvernnemnda was required to decide
what requirements the regulation should impose on the operators.
The first alternative that was assessed was an anonymous AutoPASS tag where
the tag can exist without being registered with a specific user. Right of the bat
this solution seems to provide a better approach to the anonymity issues as the
link between the user and tag is removed. From the viewpoint of AutoPASS, if
the transaction is successful and the correct amount of money is deducted from an
account, who owns the account should not really matter. This is also the rationale
behind the alternative. Money is prepaid into an account and used as in the normal
use case. However, the initial deposit should probably be paid out in cash to avoid
any credit card transactions being linked with the tag. Another problem arises when
the balance of the tag is approaching zero. Since the toll company does not know
who you are they cannot send you an invoice or reminder to deposit more money.
The only indication the user gets is the light signal at the toll plaza indicating that
the balance is low. Continued use of the tag without depositing more money will
trigger video identification, which effectively abolishes any anonymity.
The second alternative is to enter into an AutoPASS contract as normal, but the
company provides an alternative subscription where transaction logs are deleted as
soon as possible. [31] states the requirements for such subscriptions. An excerpt of
the requirements that relate to when data have to be deleted is included below.
• Storage time for transaction data at the toll plazas shall not exceed 72 hours.
• Processing time in the central system, and subsequent deletion of the trans-
action, shall not exceed 1 hour in the normal case. Transactions from other
operators’ toll plazas need to be processed and deleted within 24 hours.
In appendix C the point in the contract where you can chose this alternative subscrip-
tion is highlighted. In reality this alternative cannot be classified as anonymous - it is
just an ordinary AutoPASS contract where the storage time of personal information
is limited to a minimum. One of the drawbacks with this alternative (as well as the
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previous) is that the ability to dispute transactions is limited. The fact that the
operator deletes the transaction from their system makes it fairly easy to state that
this is a ’use at your own risk’ offer. Not diving into the legal issues it is however
interesting to notice that Bokføringsforskriften states that a sales document should
contain time and place for delivery [22, §5.1.1.4]. The same law also states that
documentation should be stored for 10 years. It is obvious that the toll companies
have to keep some form of information on the transaction to satisfy the tax authorities.
So what is initially stated as being deleted is presumably retrievable within the 10
year limit. The second alternative cannot be described as an anonymous alternative.
Personvernnemnda, who were to decide in this matter, ended up choosing the latter
alternative. The right of the NDPA to regulate the sector was upheld, alternative
two was assumed as the foundation for the regulation with the time limits mentioned
above. In addition, the NPRA was instructed to conduct an annual audit of the toll
companies to check that these requirements were met [31].
The fact is that the current system provides little to no anonymity. The problem
seems to be that the system ’allow’ users to travel through AutoPASS lanes without
paying - the cameras are needed to be able to go back and identify transactions
that were not valid. The photography and subsequent identification of the vehicle is
troublesome no matter how you relate it to anonymity. Even if good routines for
deletion together with audit procedures intended to enforce these deletion routines are
created, people concerned about their anonymity will probably still show skepticism
toward the system. Undeleted data is always a subpoena away or perhaps a law
enforcement agency will subpoena a company to not delete future transactions in
the interest of aiding an investigation. To increase the anonymity, the link between
AutoPASS tag and personal information must be removed. In a digitalized society
this is surely a daunting task. The financial system is built up in such a way that
making anonymous payments is hard. AutoPASS is a system where money changes
hands and complete anonymity is thus hard. About the only way to exchange money
without a digital record is through cash payment, provided that the transaction is
carried out without any personal information being shared. This was an alternative
when the toll roads were equipped with manual lanes accepting cash payment. This
alternative was effectively abolished with the free-flow, non-stop plazas we see today.
One very good reason why transferring money anonymously should be hard is to
fight crime or restrict the flow of money related to criminal activity. This has more
or less become a norm in society - we accept that our digital transactions are subject
to audit by governmental institutions where one of the benefits is that it becomes
significantly harder for criminals to move money.
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5.2.2 How is anonymity handled in other countries
An interesting question is to look to other countries to see how they handle the
same issues of user anonymity. The toll charging on the Golden Gate Bridge in
San Francisco has an option they market as anonymous [12]. The setup looks quite
similar to the first alternative discussed in the sections above. You can open up a
FasTrak account, which is what the system is called, where you are not required to
provide any personal information. Money is deposited in form of a cash payment.
When the toll balance is low you have to show up at a customer service center and
refill the account. If the account is not refilled and still used an invoice will be mailed
to the owner of the vehicle.
The 407 ETR in the province of Ontario, Canada provides users with a payment
option marketed as an anonymous account. The user is provided with a tag without
registering any personal information. Money is deposited by cash with an initial
deposit of $57.20 per transponder and an initial payment of $200.00 in prepaid
funds. Anonymity is lost if the credit balance falls below $0.00, if the transponder
malfunctions, is damaged in any way, not installed properly, or is lost or stolen. The
anonymous account is only available to cars with a GVWR under 5000 kg. The
terms also state that anonymity is lost if required by law pursuant to a criminal
investigation. There is no guarantee that there will not be taken a video image of a
vehicle with an anonymous tag. The terms can be found in [1].
5.2.3 A step toward bettering the anonymity in AutoPASS
Over the course of the last sections we have identified some key issues with today’s
system. For AutoPASS to provide something which can be classified as an anonymous
toll payment scheme some improvements are needed. An initial observation is that it
would be hard to keep a post-payment scheme where you are billed after the passage
- the toll road company would not be able to identify the user. Some efforts have
been put into schemes using blind signatures, zero-knowledge proofs, and digital
signatures. One such effort is outlined in paper [20]. They propose a post-payment
scheme they claim will give the user anonymity, in the sense that the trips are not
reconstructable, and guarantee the toll operator will receive the charges for all trips
made by a user [20]. The rationale is sought outlined below with the use of RSA
blinding. An introduction to RSA and blinding signatures are given in appendix D.
A Motorist and a Toll company enter into a contract regarding the usage of toll
roads. The Motorist is provided with a transponder which is equipped with a set of
digital identities D = {id1, id2, · · · , idn}. These identities should not be known to
the Toll company. The Motorist blinds the identities and sends them to the toll
5.2. ANONYMITY 61
company
Dblinded = {id1 · re mod n, id2 · re mod n, · · · , idn · re mod n} (5.1)
The article then states that the Motorist should provide the Toll company with a
digital signature of the list of identities to avoid repudiation. The Motorist digitally
signs the set of identities and provides the Toll company with the signature. These
digital identities should be unique, so the number of possible identities needs to be
large to make the probability of choosing equal identities small.
The Toll company signs the blinded signatures and return them to the Motorist
Dsigned,blined = {(id1 · re)d mod n, (id2 · re)d mod n, · · · , (idn · re)d mod n} (5.2)
The Motorist is now equipped with a set of identities which he will use at the toll
plaza. There is a distinction between open and closed tolling systems. In the former
system the Motorist uses a fresh id. After it is used, the id is stored in a list of
used ids. In the latter type of system the charge is dependent upon the entry- and
parting toll plaza. For the system to be able to calculate the correct charge, the
same identity has to be provided at point of entry and point of departure. When a
Motorist enter into a closed tolling system he is informed that the same identity has
to be provided at the departing toll plaza. The id is therefore kept available until
the Motorist has departed. After departure, the id is stored in the list of used ids.
When the Motorist passes through the Toll plaza, the Motorist is provided with
a certificate showing that the Toll plaza is signed by the Toll company with the
purpose of collecting toll. If the certificate proves valid, the Motorist provides the
Toll plaza with an identity idi and the corresponding identity which has been
blinded and signed by the Toll company. The Toll plaza can then, with the
knowledge of the Toll plaza’s public key, verify the identity.
If this was an open system, the Mororist uses the same id when exiting the toll road.
The Toll plaza sees that the same id has been used both inbound and outbound
and is able to calculate the correct toll charge. The id, along with the calculated
charge is sent to the Toll company and stored in a list of receivables. The Motorist
also stores the id in a list holding all the used ids.
The Motorist is responsible the ids that make up the intersection between M and T
shown in figure 5.2. This is the intersection between the Motorist’s ids and the ids
stored by the Toll company for charging. The Motorist and Toll company now
enter into a reconciliation protocol where the ids in the intersection are billed the
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M T
M ∩ T
Figure 5.2: Intersection between the Motorist’s (M) used ids and the Toll
company’s (T) stored ids.
Motorist. The Motorist calculates the intersection between the receivables-list from
the Toll company and his own used-ids list. A zero-knowledge proof is made by the
Motorist to the fact that all identities are accounted for. The result is sent to the
Toll company which generates an invoice, without knowing the digital identity (just
the digital signature) of the Motorist. The Motorist cannot cheat as he signs the
blinded identities and must prove that all ids are accounted for in the reconciliation
process.
5.2.4 Evaluation of the protocol
The proposal given in [20] represents an effort to utilize cryptographic principles
to a much larger extent compared to previously outlined anonymous AutoPASS
alternatives and the examples from San Francisco and Toronto. The original paper
does not give any concrete implementation of the proposed protocol, for example how
the blind signatures are made, how the lists are shared, or how the zero-knowledge
proof is accomplished. The introduction of blinded RSA signatures in the outline
given above represents is a small, yet important, contribution in this respect. If
such protocols are to become a reality, they need to be laid out explicitly, with full
description of the underlying cryptographic mechanisms.
The proposed protocol differs from other anonymous toll protocols in the way of
post-payments. In both examples given earlier, the user is required to make payments
in advance, and loses anonymity if the tag is used with insufficient credit balance.
Post-payments shifts a lot of responsibility over on the users - in the outlined protocol,
if users fail to participate in the reconciliation protocol, the toll company is not able
to identify them. If the used ids of the motorist are stored on the OBU and it is
suddenly lost, intentionally or unintentionally, the reconciliation protocol does not
work. For a motorist to not partake in the reconciliation phase is unacceptable to
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the toll company, so there need to be sanctions for intentionally failing to prepare
the OBU for reconciliation. On the other hand, malfunction or failures of the OBU
where the owner is not to blame, poses a risk for the tolling company, as potential
revenue is lost.

Chapter6Conclusion and further work
6.1 Conclusion
This thesis has provided an introduction to the AutoPASS system currently used
on toll roads in Norway to provide a free-flow, non-stop payment service for levying
toll. As a contribution to help solve the problem with a high number of unidentified
passages, a simulator and analysis tool have been set up. The purpose of the simulator
was to generate traffic data for the analysis tool to process. The analysis tool is
meant to be an aid in the process of directing resources to toll plazas that show the
highest number of unregistered passages. By analyzing the output from the program
a strategy for executing manual controls can be planned and set up at places where
the hit-rate will be large. Results have shown that toll plazas that stand out with
respect to the number of unidentified passes can be identified based on statistics that
does not reveal personal information about the driver of the vehicle.
The anonymity issues of AutoPASS are addressed and the communication between
the NDPA as regulator and the NPRA as owner has been covered. A view of how
other countries handle the problem of anonymity is given. Lastly, an initiative to
provide a better Electronic Toll Collection (ETC) protocol with respect to anonymity
is covered. This shows that there are possibilities to better the situation. The NDPA
is an important advocate for the individual’s right to privacy, but that alone is not
enough. For changes to happen and more focus to be given to anonymity, individual
users need to express their concerns and call for better solutions.
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6.2 Further work
The next step further would be to test the system on real production data. Statistics
need to be generated from the central system according to what is outlined. There
are still some legal issues that need to be dealt with and lessons can definitely be
learned from the automatic number plate reading system used in conjunction with
the road traffic controls. The reports referenced in regard to the latter system are of
recent date, and the deadline for improvements of the shortcomings revealed by the
NDPA in their investigation of the NPRA was 1th of June 2013. The development
of this case will play an important role and lay much of the foundation that the
proposed system for AutoPASS will have to deal with.
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AppendixADoppler shift calculation
Center frequency of the channel: 5.7975 GHz.
∆f : ± 1000 Hz.
If the velocity involved is small relative to the speed of light, ∆f can be expressed as
∆f = ∆v
c
f0 (A.1)
where ∆v is the difference in velocity between the two points, c is the speed of light
and f0 is the emitted frequency.
Rearranging terms gives
∆v = ∆f
f0
c (A.2)
Inserting numbers gives us the result
∆v = 1000 Hz5.7975 · 109 Hz 3 · 10
8 m/s ≈ 51.75 m/s ≈ 186.3 km/h (A.3)
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AppendixBData Encryption Standard (DES)
DES is a symmetric-key block cipher which started as an IBM project led by Horst
Feistel in the late 1960s early 1970s. Feistel and his team proposed an algorithm
which was called LUCIFER - a block cipher with 128 bits key size and 64 bit block
size. In an effort to commercialize the product on a single chip, the algorithm was
modified - one thing that was altered was the key size, which was shrunk to 56 bits∗
[34]. When the National Bureau of Standards (NBS), today known as the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), issued a call for a national standard
for protecting sensitive information, LUCIFER was submitted in the reduced key
size form and was selected as the new data encryption standard. The algorithm is
published as standard FIPS PUB 46 - Data Encryption Standard, with later revisions
FIPS PUB 46-2 and FIPS PUB 46-3.
LUCIFER, and also DES, is built up around what is known as a feistel structure.
The cipher works in rounds where data is substituted and permuted. Substitution
means to replace a data element with another, for example to swap the letter ’e’ with
’g’. When the cipher permutes the data, nothing is added or taken out, the data is
just rearranged to form a new ordering of the data, for example to permute the string
’abcde’ to ’badce’. As mentioned this is done in rounds, and in every round, bits from
∗ Some may say that the key is actually 64 bits, but only 56 bits are used in the cipher, the
other eight are parity bits.
DES Encryption
K56
P64 C64 DES Decryption
K56
C64 P64
Figure B.1: DES operations
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a key, K, are put into the mix, successively building up the ciphertext. Decryption
is performed by running through the same steps in the inverse order as they were
applied. A round function, F , is applied every round, where the substitution and
permutation are performed. The input is split into two halves, Lx and Rx, where x
designates the round number. The left half, Lx, is XOR-ed with the output from
the round function and passed on as the right input, Rx+1, in the next round. Rx is
used as input to the round function, F , and used as the left part, Lx+1, in the next
round. An overview of the DES round scheme is shown in figure B.2.
B.1 DES with multiple keys
In order to provide more key-bits and still provide backward compatibility, what is
known as triple DES (3DES) in the case of three keys and 2DES in the case of two
keys, have been developed. Different versions exist, and they differ in keying options.
B.1.1 2DES keying
Here we use two independent keys, K1 6= K2.
C = EK2 [EK1(P )] (B.1)
P = DK1 [DK2(C)] (B.2)
We have a key-space of 2112 using two keys. The problem is that an attacker can
reduce the key space quite drastically, provided that he knows a pair of ciphertext
and plaintext. The rationale is to compute
x = EK1(P ) ∀ K1 ∈ {0, 1}56 (B.3)
y = DK2(C) ∀ K2 ∈ {0, 1}56 (B.4)
and store one variable in a lookup table and compare against the other successively
looking for matches. When a match is found you have two candidate keys for K1
and K2. Computing the table require O(256) DES encryptions. This is done twice,
so the overall complexity for the DES calculation is O(257) = 2 · 256. The lookup
table will also require storage space O(256).
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plaintext
initial permutation
R0L0
F+
K1
R1L1
...
...
R15L15
F+
K16
L16 R16
inverse initial permutation
ciphertext
Figure B.2: DES round structure
B.1.2 3DES keying
The plaintext is encrypted using key K3. The output from this round is decrypted
using key K2. The output from this round is encrypted again using key K1 to
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produce the final ciphertext. This setup is the same for every keying option; the
difference lies in how the Ks are defined.
Option 1, three independent keys
Using this keying scheme, all three keys are independent, K1 6= K2 6= K3, giving us
168 bits of keying material.
C = EK1 [DK2 [EK3(P )]] (B.5)
P = DK3 [EK2 [DK1(C)]] (B.6)
Option 2, two independent keys
Using this keying scheme we have K1 = K3 6= K2 giving us 112 bits of keying
material.
C = EK1 [DK2 [EK1(P )]] (B.7)
P = DK1 [EK2 [DK1(C)]] (B.8)
Option 3, the same key
Using this keying scheme we have K1 = K2 = K3 giving us 56 bits of keying material.
Using the given encryption function, this reduces to plain DES, as the decryption
removes the first encryption.
C = EK1 [DK2 [EK1(P )]] = EK1(P ) (B.9)
P = DK1 [EK2 [DK1(C)]] = DK1(C) (B.10)
Discussion of keying options
Option 3 is provided to support legacy systems that only support one-key DES.
Option 2 is an effort to increase the difficulty of performing a Meet in the Middle
(MITM) attack over 2DES and option 3 gives even more key-space compared to
option 2.
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B.2 Weak keys
Weak keys are cryptographic keys that make the cipher behave in a way that
significantly reduce the strength of the cipher. As an example of such undesired
behavior - DES has 4 keys where the encryption function is the same as the decryption
function [26].
C = EK1 [EK1(P )]] = P (B.11)
The four keys that have this property are listed in listing B.1. The key is first shown
in hexadecimal notation, followed by the binary representation. Notice that the key
is 64 bits long and that the last bit in every byte is a parity bit.
010101010101010116
00000001000000010000000100000001000000010000000100000001000000012
FEFEFEFEFEFEFEFE16
11111110111111101111111011111110111111101111111011111110111111102
1F1F1F1F1F1F1F1F16
00011111000111110001111100011111000111110001111100011111000111112
E0E0E0E0E0E0E0E016
11100000111000001110000011100000111000001110000011100000111000002
Listing B.1: DES weak keys. From [21]
Along with the four keys listed in listing B.1, DES has six key-pairs where encrypting
with the first key and encrypting again with the second key will effectively decrypt
the message. These are referred to as semi-weak keys. The keys are not listed here
but can be found in [26].
When building applications that use DES one should be aware of this problem. Since
2DES and 3DES build on the same principles as ordinary DES, the problem of weak
keys will still be present. If the key is generated at random, the probability of picking
one of the ten keys mentioned above is not very big, 10264 ≈ 5.42 · 10−19. On the other
hand, the list of weak keys is not that big and it is still good practice to verify that
the generated key is not weak.

AppendixCAutoPASS example contract
(Fjellinjen)
Enclosed in figure C.1 is Fjellinjen’s AutoPASS user contract.
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Figure C.1: Fjellinjen’s AutoPASS user contract
AppendixDRSA and blind signatures
Blind signatures are a scheme where one can obtain a signed digital message without
revealing the contents of the message to the signing entity. An example of such a
blind signature scheme is given for the RSA public-key algorithm. A description of
the RSA scheme is given in section D.1 to together a blind signature scheme based
on RSA in section D.2.
The original paper on RSA can be found here [33].
D.1 RSA
Choose two random prime numbers p and q of similar length.
Calculate
n = p · q (D.1)
φ(n) = φ(p) · φ(q) = (p− 1) · (q − 1) (D.2)
Choose e where
1 < e < φ(n) and gcd(e, φ(n)) = 1 (D.3)
Calculate a multiplicative inverse d of e mod (φ(n))
d−1 ≡ e mod (φ(n)). Equivalently d · e ≡ 1 mod (φ(n)) (D.4)
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e is known as the public key and is made public.
d is known as the private key and is kept secret.
Encrypting a message to receiver A(d, e, pq = n)
c ≡Me mod (n) (D.5)
where M is the plaintext message transformed into an integer and padded according
to a padding scheme. e is A’s public key.
Decrypting a message at receiver A(d, e, pq = n)
M ≡ cd mod (n) (D.6)
where d is A’s private key.
D.2 Blind signatures (With RSA)
Choose a random number r relatively prime to n. Calculate the blinded message
Mb = M · re mod (n) (D.7)
Send Mb to signing authority. The message is signed with the signing authority’s
private key
Sb = Mdb mod (n) (D.8)
= Md · (re)d mod (n) ≡Md · r mod (n) (D.9)
Note that red ≡ r mod (n).
The message is sent back to the user. With knowledge of r the user removes the
blinding factor to obtain the signed message
S ≡ Sb · r−1 mod (n) = Md · r · r−1 mod (n)→ S ≡Md mod (n) (D.10)
